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On Conditional Cryptocurrency With Privacy
ABSTRACT
In this paper, we present the design and implementation of a conditional cryptocurrency system with privacy protection. Unlike the
existing approaches that often depend on smart contracts where
cryptocurrencies are first locked in a vault, and then released according to event triggers, the conditional cryptocurrency system
encodes event outcome as part of a cryptocurrency note in a UTXO
based system. Without relying on any triggering mechanism, the
proposed system separates event processing from conditional coin
transaction processing where conditional cryptocurrency notes
can be transferred freely in an asynchronous manner, only with
their asset values conditional to the linked event outcomes. The
main advantage of such design is that it enables free trade of conditional assets and prevents assets from being locked. In this work, we
demonstrate a method of confidential conditional coin by extending
the Zerocoin data model and protocol. The system is implemented
and evaluated using xJsnark.

1 INTRODUCTION
The primary objective of this work is to enable cryptocurrency
notes (e.g., UTXO based coins) with conditional values, specifically
for pri-vacy coins (e.g., Zcash [22]). Although connecting
cryptocurrency transactions with events [24] (such as issuing
transactions based on event triggers) is not new, the proposed
approach distinguishes from the prior efforts in several aspects.
First, it associates event conditions with UTXO based privacy
coins, demonstrated using Zcash as a targeted system, which is
named as conditional privacy coins. Second, the links between
events and conditional coins are confidential to achieve condition
privacy. Using a zero-knowledge based protocol, a conditional
coin can be validated against the as-sociated event outcome
without disclosing which event that it has been linked to. Third,
conditional coins can be transferred and traded freely in the
system before the associated event has occurred or its outcome has
been declared (asynchronous). There is no lock-up period of
assets. Coins with conditions can be exchanged and transferred,
just like regular UTXO notes. It is the value of a con-ditional
coin, not a transaction of the coin, that is conditional to event
outcome. This has significant benefits over some existing or
alternative designs that freeze assets in a vault or smart contract

before event result is published. Fourth, the system decouples event
processing and transaction processing. This mechanism facilitates
conditional coin processing and allows transactions of conditional
coins to be validated in an asynchronous manner from the event
handling by the system. Such separation potentially can support
rich and more complex event processing like event combination,
event reasoning, and proposition logic over event conditions, to
mention just a few.
To summarize, the main contributions of the paper are: (i) We
propose a conditional privacy cryptocurrency system design where
confidential event conditions are associated with privacy coins.
(ii) The proposed design allows conditional coins to be transferred,
exchanged, and traded freely in an asynchronous manner from
event processing logic. There is no asset lock-up or freeze of conditional coins in a vault that a release is triggered in accordance with
event results. It is the value of the coins that is conditional to event
outcome. (iii) We implement the conditional privacy coin protocol
in xJsnark with Zcash as a reference model.

2

OVERVIEW

Problem statement: To enable private and transferable conditional coins, the system needs to meet the following requirements:
• Privacy coins (e.g., use Zcash as a base model and initial target) are associated with event conditions. Conditional coins
can be validated against event outcomes. However, links between conditional coins and events (both event definitions
and event outcome announcements) are hidden from the
validators.
• The system should support complete transferability of conditional coins where a conditional coin after its creation can
be transferred unfettered by its current owner using the default privacy coin transaction protocol regardless if the event
outcome has been declared or not.
• Event processing and transaction processing are decoupled.
There is a separation between event processing and conditional coin transactions. Event processing includes registration of events and event outcome announcements/declarations. Updates to each part of the decoupled system are
asynchronous.
• All the coins in the system, regardless if they have event conditions attached or not, are indistinguishable. The system
does not treat privacy coins with event conditions differently from the coins without event conditions. Transactions
involving privacy coins with event conditions are indistinguishable from the transactions of the coins without event
conditions.
It is worth mentioning that certain things are outside the scope
of this paper. These include:
• Validation of real-world event outcome which can be done
with several approaches described in the literature such as
using TEEs, zero-knowledge proof, multi-party computation,
etc;

• Oracle service, which is an orthogonal topic (Oracle service
can be integrated with event processing and our system can
be made to support any type of Oracle service design);
• Design of sophisticated event logic - a subject related to
event processing and a possible direction of future research.
In addition, to make things simple, we assume in this paper that
all event conditions are binary. The design can be easily extended to
non-binary event conditions. The system can support a wide range
of application scenarios in decentralized finance, logisitcs, supply
chains, prediction markets, risk management, insurance, to name
just a few. For instance, events can be defined such as “Bitcoin
price increases by 5%”, “Interests rate is lowered by more than
2% in the coming month”, “Goods shipped with tracking number
1Z54F78A0450293517 is delivered”, “Australia qualifies for semifinal of world cup 2023”, “Gold index rose more than 1%”.
System overview: To meet these requirements, first, we adopt
a system, where event processing is decoupled from the transaction processing. There are separate logical chains of records for
registering event definitions, announcements of event outcomes,
and conditional privacy coin transactions 1 . In this paper, we assume that there is a global distributed ledger for supporting all the
three types of data records. In addition, the system defines constant
events and constant event outcomes in the genesis block.
Transaction examples: Figure 1 provides an example of association between event definitions, event outcome announcements,
and commitments of the conditional coins. Each type of data has its
own logical chain and the corresponding Merkle hash tree. All the
event definitions and event outcome announcements are in public.
They are validated before appended to the ledger. In this work, we
assume that event outcomes are declared by the same parties who
register the events to the ledger (verified through a secure digital
signature scheme). Verification of the event outcome itself (e.g.,
status of a tracked shipment) is a separate question, which could be
supported through a variety of approaches such as Oracle service,
a group of event validators (with tolerance of Byzantine failures),
multi-party computation, or zero-knowledge proof based claim verification scheme (e.g., [26]). We assume that event outcomes are
verified as part of the event processing before they are appended
to the shared ledger.
All privacy coins in the system are conditional coins. A privacy
coin without a real condition is configured to use one of the default constant events as its condition. This way, all the transactions
involving conditional coins in the system (payments using conditional coins or transferring of conditional coins) follow the same
validation steps in zero-knowledge protocol when deciding whether
the transactions should be accepted by the participating distributed
ledger nodes.
When a privacy coin with a default constant event as its condition
is transferred or spent, the output coins may maintain the same
constant event as conditions. To associate a privacy coins with
an event outcome, an input privacy coin with a satisfied event
condition can be split into two output coins with outcomes of a new
event as conditions. The two output coins must have opposite event
1 These separate chains of records (event definitions, event announcements, conditional

coin transactions) can be implemented either as one distributed ledger or as sub-ledgers
of one global ledger. We leave such option as specific implementation issue independent
from the data models and conditional coin protocol design.
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Figure 1: Illustration of conditional coin transactions.
Event Logic
Event 7 def: E7
= E5 and E6

Event 5 def: E5
= E1 and E2

Event 1 def:
E1

Event 2 def:
E2

Event 6 def: E6
= E3 or E4

Event 3 def:
E3

Event 4 def:
E4

Leaf event definitions

Figure 2: Support for complex event logic and processing.
outcomes as their conditions, as illustrated by the two transactions
tx1 and tx3 in Figure 1. Each output coin has the same total value
as the input coins.
Conditional coins can be transferred as demonstrated by tx2 in
Figure 1. To remove the condition, the coin needs to be spent with
a matched event outcome, see tx3. Validation is done using zeroknowledge proof without leaking the associated event definition
and event outcome. After the condition is removed, a conditional
coin can either have a different event condition attached, or switch
back to one of the default events as its condition.
Under this framework, it is possible to support complex event
processing and event reasoning. A calculus system of events can
be defined; and new complex events can be created based on the
existing events as shown in Fig 2. In addition, event processing can
be augmented with smart contract support to enable more diverse
means for validating event outcomes.
Applications: Privacy preserving conditional coins may enable
and facilitate a wide range of applications including but not limited
to, transferable confidential assets with valuation based on event
outcomes, bill of exchange based on crypto-assets, future contracts,
prediction market, and use case areas such as logistics, FinTech,
insurance (such as enable secondary market), etc.

3

DATA MODELS

The data models are based on extending the notations of Zcash [8,
17]. In this paper, for simplification, we apply zk-SNARK and the
original Zcash design [8, 17] to achieve an exemplary implementation. However, it is worthwhile pointing out that it is plausible to realize the described data models and protocol using alternative backend zero-knowledge proving systems such as zk-STARK [1], bulletproof [4]. Discussion leveraging different back-end zero-knowledge
proving systems is orthogonal to the scope of this work, which

Table 1: Data definitions

𝑒𝐼 𝐷
𝑏𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑡
𝑏𝑎
𝑝𝑘 sig

𝑒𝑎𝐼 𝐷
𝑒𝐼 𝐷
𝑏ℎ
𝑣
𝑎𝑝𝑘
𝑣
𝑒𝐼 𝐷
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑
𝜌
𝛾
𝑐𝑚

Event definition attributes
64-bit unique identifier for event definition
64-bit time threshold of event outcome (block height)
event definition with repeated outcome announcements
event outcome announced before or after the time limit
public key of a public/private signature key pair (𝑝𝑘 sig , 𝑠𝑘 sig ) for event
outcome announcement
Event announcement attributes
64-bit unique identifier for event outcome announcement
64-bit identifier for the associated event definition
64-bit time stamp (block height)
event outcome value
Conditional coin attributes - extended Zcash coin definition
public key of payment address pair (𝑎𝑝𝑘 , 𝑎𝑠𝑘 ) where 𝑎𝑠𝑘 is the spending
key
value of coin
64-bit identifier for the associated event definition
expected event outcome
used to compute nullifier (disclosed to the public after spending)
trapdoor
note commitment (comm)

focuses primarily on the front-end protocol design of a blockchain
based privacy preserving transaction system for conditional coins.
Conditional privacy coin ledger: There is a distributed ledger,
LCPC , which records a sequence of transactions in append-only
mode. The ledger could be implemented as a blockchain where
transactions are recorded as blockchain blocks. The ledger supports
multiple types of transactions designed for event registration and
declaration as well as transferring of conditional coins. The ledger
comprises ordered blocks created from a genesis block under a
consensus mechanism. Each block has a block height. Further, we
assume that blocks are generated with a relatively constant speed.
Details of the consensus mechanism and block generation could
either be based on or follow the Zcash design that adopts Proofof-Work for blockchain consensus. Although our data models and
protocol are based on extending Zcash specification, the design can
be adapted to any blockchain based systems, for instance substituting PoW consensus with Proof-of-Stake (PoS) or different flavors
of BFTs.
There are three main types of data records: (i) records for event
registration and definition; (ii) records for event outcome declaration; and (iii) records for conditional coin payment and transferring.
For simplicity, we assume in this work that all the records are
managed by a single ledger. However, since event processing is
decoupled from the conditional coin transactions, it is plausible
to track these records separately, using sub-chains or sub-ledgers.
For instance, a system can employ a sub-chain for event registration and event declaration/announcement, and another sub-chain
for conditional coin transactions. A global chain could be used to
coordinate these sub-chains in way similar to the concept of sharding. A key point is that our system does not place restriction on
alternative implementations that optimize for throughput and/or
parallel transaction processing. Event processing and conditional
coin transactions are asynchronous.
The data models are described in Table 1. Note format of the
conditional coins is based on extension over the Zcash note format.
Event definition: The system defines events as tuples of attributes
as shown in Table 1. After an event definition is registered to the

ledger, there could be one or multiple event declarations or announcements associated with it (based on the single bit attribute
repeat - true or false). Each event definition is uniquely identified
with a 64-bit value eID. Attribute bt is a block height value that
specifies when value of the event (outcome of the event) should
be declared or announced to the system. When ba is true, event
outcome should be announced before the block height set by bt.
Otherwise when ba is false, event outcome should be announced
after block bt.
To allow only authorized parties to declare event outcomes, for
each registered event definition, there is a public/private signature
key pair (𝑝𝑘 sig , 𝑠𝑘 sig ). Public key 𝑝𝑘 sig is disclosed during registration. When outcome of the event is declared sometime later, private
key 𝑠𝑘 sig will be used to sign the event transaction that announces
the event outcome. For repetitive event, a new signature key pair
will be created each time there is an event outcome declaration.
In addition, there are default event definitions that serve as con𝑑𝑓 𝑡
𝑑𝑓 𝑡
stant events (always true and always false), 𝑒𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 and 𝑒𝑑𝑒 𝑓 𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 .
These constant events are defined in the genesis block. To prevent
denial-of-service, a fee is charged for event registration.
Event outcome announcement: For a registered event definition,
its outcome will be declared with an event outcome transaction.
Each outcome announcement includes the attributes described in
Table 1. Attribute eID specifies the associated event ID (as a key
linking to the corresponding event definition). Attribute eaID is a
64-bit value that uniquely identifies an event outcome declaration.
Attribute bh serves as a timestamp value in block height. Event
outcome is encoded in attribute 𝑣. In this work, we assume binary
event outcome. The system can be extended to more complex event
outcome scenarios, which is a subject of future work. For the default
constant events, their event outcomes are defined in the genesis
𝑑𝑓 𝑡
𝑑𝑓 𝑡
block as 𝑒𝑎 𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 and 𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 .
Payment address and conditional note format: We use the
same Zcash design of payment address pair (𝑎𝑠𝑘 , 𝑎𝑝𝑘 ) where 𝑎𝑠𝑘
is used as spending key. For receiving shielded payment, a user
needs to scan ledger LCPC using (𝑎𝑝𝑘 , 𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑐 ). The algorithm is similar to the one described in Zcash blockchain scanning. There is a
vpub , similar to the public value in Zcash. Coin values embedded in
conditional notes can be transferred to vpub and vice versa.
A conditional note, 𝑛, is similar to the Zcash note with extensions
to support pairing of the note with an event definition and event
outcome. Note attributes including 𝑎𝑝𝑘 , 𝜌, 𝛾, and 𝑣 are the same as
defined in Zcash. For each note, attribute eID associates the note
with an event definition where eID serves as the key. Attribute cond
specifies anticipated event outcome. When declared event outcome
matches with the expected event outcome encoded in a conditional
note, the note will maintain its coin value 𝑣. Otherwise, the note
will lose its value.
A conditional note can be spent or transferred without waiting
for announcement of the anticipated event outcome. This characteristic, transferability of conditional coins/notes before event
occurrence, makes our system distinguishing from other designs
that rely on event triggers. Note that even a conditional coin note
loses its value, it can still be transferred.
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Figure 4: Diagram of zero-knowledge proving system.
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When a note is spent, a nullifier value, nf , will be created using
𝑛𝑓
attribute 𝜌 as input where nf is determined by PRF𝑎𝑠𝑘 (𝜌). PRF is
a pseudo-random function that can be implemented using SHA2.
The decentralized system enforces that nullifiers must be unique in
order to prevent double-spending.
Multiple Merkle trees: LCPC uses incremental Merkle trees of
fixed depth for event definitions, event outcome announcements,
and note commitments. In this work, for simplicity, we assume that
there are separate Merkle trees, 𝑀 edef , 𝑀 ea , and 𝑀 tx for each data
record type. It is plausible to have one unified Merkle tree for all
the data records. Each Merkle tree has its own root, denoted as
𝑟𝑡 edef , 𝑟𝑡 ea , and 𝑟𝑡 tx respectively. In a Merkle tree, we represent the
location of a data record as (pos, path) where pos is the leaf node
position in the tree, and path is the path of Merkle hash computation
from the leaf node to the root.
Public parameters: In the case of the experiments in this paper,
the system uses the same set of public parameters pp in Zcash design.
They are generated either by a trusted party at the beginning or
through a Multi-Party Computation ceremony [2, 3]. If the system
is implemented over a proving system that does not require trusted
setup, the public parameters can be based on common public strings
appropriate for the proving system.
Note that in this work, we restrict conditional coin payment
and transferring to cases of two input notes and two output notes.
Payment involving more than two input notes or two output notes
can be reduced to a series of transactions, each only involving two
notes as input and output. Similar to the Zcash design, an input
note or an output note can be a dummy note (without associated
note commitment). In the case of dummy note, the asset value is
zero.

without disclosing information about the witness input other than
that included in the claim/statement.
A zero-knowledge proving system needs to satisfy the following
security requirements: completeness, succinctness, and proof-ofknowledge.
Completeness: for security parameter 𝜆, a F, arithmetic circuit
C [20], and any (𝜒, 𝜔) ∈ R (satisfying inputs), honest prover can
convince the verifier with probability 1 − 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑙 (𝜆).
Succinctness: honestly generated proof 𝜋 has 𝑂𝑛 (1) bits and Verify(𝑣𝑘,
𝜒, 𝜋) runs in the 𝑂 𝜆 (|𝜒 |).
Proof-of-knowledge: If the verifier accepts a proof output by
a bounded prover, then the prover knows witness for the given
statement.

4.2

Transaction Algorithms

For completeness, this subsection lists the main algorithms. The
main extensions are related to the JoinSplit transaction. JoinSplit
is extended to support associating a privacy UTXO note with an
event outcome.
SetupCPC : Follows the same Zcash algorithm for constructing public parameters. 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑝𝐶𝑃𝐶 takes 1𝜆 as security parameter and outputs public parameters 𝑝𝑝 CPC that includes: 𝑝𝑘 JoinSplit , 𝑣𝑘 JoinSplit ,
𝑝𝑝 enc , 𝑝𝑝 sig . 𝑝𝑘 𝐽 𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡 and 𝑣𝑘 𝐽 𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡 are a pair of proving and
verifying keys for JoinSplit transactions. 𝑝𝑝 enc is encryption key
and 𝑝𝑝 sig is signature key.
Algorithm 1: Public parameter generation algorithm.

1
2
3
4
5

Input : Security parameter 𝜆, proving circuit C JoinSplit
Output : Public parameters 𝑝𝑝 CPC
Compute C JoinSplit at security parameter 𝜆
Compute (𝑝𝑘 JoinSplit , 𝑣𝑘 JoinSplit ) = KeyGen(1𝜆 , C JoinSplit )
Create 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑐 = G𝑒𝑛𝑐 (1𝜆 )
Create 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑔 = G𝑠𝑖𝑔 (1𝜆 )
Output 𝑝𝑝 CPC = (𝑝𝑘 JoinSplit , 𝑣𝑘 JoinSplit , 𝑝𝑝 enc , 𝑝𝑝 sig )

CreateAddrCPC : It takes public parameters 𝑝𝑝 CPC as input and
creates
a pair of transmission key (𝑎𝑝𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑐 ) and receiving key
4 PROTOCOL DESIGN FOR CONDITIONAL
(𝑎𝑝𝑘 , 𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑐 ) where a note sent to a recipient is encrypted using
PRIVACY COINS WITH TRANSFERABILITY
𝑝𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑐 and it is retrieved by the recipient from the ledger using 𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑐 .
4.1 Preliminary
Similar to the Zcash design, the algorithm creates 𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑐 and 𝑝𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑐
key pair using Curve25519 key agreement. The value of 𝐾𝐴.𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒,
The protocol extends the design of zero-knowledge based privacy
payment system with Zcash as the baseline. Privacy oriented blockchains computation of 𝐾𝐴.𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 and 𝐾𝐴.𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 follow
the Zcash implementation.
apply zero-knowledge proving system as the underlying building
block to protect privacy. A zero-knowledge proving system is a
MintCPC : It takes public parameters 𝑝𝑝 CPC , public address pair
cryptography protocol that allows proving a particular claim/s(𝑎𝑝𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑐 ), 𝜋, value 𝑣 where 𝑣 ∈ (0, ..., 𝑣 max ), a default constant
tatement, dependent on two input datasets, public and witness,
event definition. It appends note 𝑛 to the ledger 𝐿CPC , or output ⊥

Table 2: Data fields defined in 𝜔.

Algorithm 2: Address generation.
1
2
3
4
5
6

Output : key pairs: (𝑎𝑝𝑘 , 𝑎𝑠𝑘 ) and (𝑝𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑐 , 𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑐 )
Set 𝑎𝑠𝑘 = PRF𝑎𝑠𝑘 (𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)
Set 𝑎𝑝𝑘 = PRF𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟
𝑎𝑠𝑘 (0)
Set 𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑐 = 𝐾𝐴.𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 (𝑃𝑅𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟
(1))
𝑠𝑘
Set 𝑝𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑐 = 𝐾𝐴.𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 (𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑐 , 𝐾𝐴.𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒)
Set transmission key as (𝑎𝑝𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑐 )
Set receiving key as (𝑎𝑝𝑘 , 𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑐 )

𝑛 old
1..𝑁
old
𝑎𝑠𝑘,1..𝑁
old
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑛,1..𝑁
old
𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑛,1..𝑁

𝜑
𝑒𝑎 old
1..𝑁

(reject). This algorithm is used to mint notes based on the public
value and put the notes on 𝐿CPC .
JoinSplitCPC : JoinSplitCPC takes a set of input values and creates
two output notes, 𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑤
and 𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑤
1
2 , and a transaction 𝑡𝑥 JoinSplit . Algorithm 3 lists pseudo-code adapted from the Zcash specification.
With such transactions, conditional coin notes can be created by
spending existing notes and transferred regardless whether the
event outcome has been declared.
Algorithm 3: JoinSplit algorithm for conditional privacy
coins.
Input : Public parameters 𝑝𝑝 CPC , ledger 𝐿CPC (including Merkle
tree 𝑀 tx and root 𝑟𝑡 tx , Merkle tree 𝑀 edef and root 𝑟𝑡 edef ,
Merkle tree 𝑀 ea and root 𝑟𝑡 ea ), input note 𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑑
and 𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑑
1
2 ,
old and 𝑎𝑜𝑙𝑑 , event outcomes
input note spending keys 𝑎𝑠𝑘,1
𝑠𝑘,2

1

old
associated with the input note 𝑒𝑎 old
1 and 𝑒𝑎 2 , event
𝑛𝑒𝑤
definition paired with the new notes 𝑒𝑑𝑒 𝑓
, output
new and 𝑎 new , public value 𝑣 old , block height
addresses 𝑎𝑝𝑘,1
𝑝𝑘,2
pub
block𝑛
Output : A transaction 𝑡𝑥 join_split with two output conditional coin
notes
𝑛𝑓
For each input note, compute nullifier 𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑑 = PRF oldold (𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑑
𝑖 .𝜌) =
𝑎𝑠𝑘,𝑖

old ∥𝑛 old .𝜌)
SHA256(𝑎𝑠𝑘,𝑖
𝑖
2

3

4
5
6

7

8

Create signature key pair (𝑝𝑘 sig , 𝑠𝑘 sig ) = 𝜅 sig (𝑝𝑝 sig ) where 𝜅 sig
generates a key pair for signature signing
Compute ℎ sig = CRH(𝑛𝑓1old , 𝑛𝑓2old , 𝑝𝑘 sig ) where CRH is a collision
resistant hash function
𝜌
Set 𝜌𝑖new = PRF𝜑 (𝑖, ℎ𝑠𝑖𝑔 ) = SHA256(𝑖 ∥𝜑 ∥ℎ𝑠𝑖𝑔 )
For each new note, sample a random 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑤
new , 𝑣 new ,
Set new conditional note and its attributes as 𝑛𝑖new = (𝑎𝑝𝑘,𝑖
𝑖
𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝑛𝑒𝑤
new
𝑒𝑑𝑒 𝑓
, 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖
, 𝜌 𝑖 , 𝛾𝑖 )
Compute new note commitment 𝑐𝑚𝑖new = NoteCommit (𝑛𝑖new ) where
NoteCommit is based on SHA256
𝑝𝑘
Compute old note spending signature ℎ𝑖 = PRF 𝑜𝑙𝑑 (𝑖 | |ℎ𝑠𝑖𝑔 )
𝑎𝑠𝑘,𝑖

10

𝑛𝑒𝑤 , 𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑤 )
Encrypt new note as 𝑁𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐,𝑛𝑒𝑤 = Eenc (𝑝𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑐,𝑖
𝑖
tx
edef
ea
𝑜𝑙𝑑
Set public input 𝜒 = (𝑟𝑡 , 𝑟𝑡
, 𝑟𝑡 , 𝑛𝑓1 , 𝑛𝑓2𝑜𝑙𝑑 , 𝑐𝑚 1new , 𝑐𝑚 2new ,
old , 𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑤 , 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 , ℎ
𝑣pub
𝑛 𝑠𝑖𝑔 , ℎ 1 , ℎ 2 )
𝑝𝑢𝑏

11

old
old old
old
old
Set witness 𝜔 = (𝑛 old
1 , 𝑛 2 , 𝑎𝑠𝑘,1 , 𝑎𝑠𝑘,2 , 𝜑, 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦1 , dummy 2 ,

9

old , 𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ old , 𝑝𝑜𝑠 old , 𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ old , 𝑒𝑎 old , 𝑒𝑎 old , 𝑝𝑜𝑠 old , 𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ old ,
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑛,1
𝑛,1
𝑛,2
𝑛,2
1
2
𝑒𝑎,1
𝑒𝑎,1
old , 𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ old , 𝑛 new , 𝑛 new , 𝑒𝑑𝑒 𝑓 new , 𝑝𝑜𝑠 new , 𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ new )
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑎,2
𝑒𝑎,2 1
2
𝑒𝑑𝑒 𝑓
edef
12
13
14
15

Compute proof 𝜋JoinSplit = Prove(𝑝𝑘 JoinSplit , 𝜒, 𝜔)
Set transaction message 𝑚 = (𝜒, 𝜋JoinSplit , 𝑁 1enc,new , 𝑁 2𝑒𝑛𝑐,𝑛𝑒𝑤 )
Set message signature 𝛿 = 𝑆 sig (𝑠𝑘 sig , 𝑚)
new , ∗) where * =
Set 𝑡𝑥 join_split = (𝑟𝑡 tx , 𝑛𝑓1old , 𝑛𝑓2old , 𝑐𝑚 1new , 𝑐𝑚 2new , 𝑣pub

(𝑝𝑘 sig , ℎ 1 , ℎ 2 , 𝜋JoinSplit , 𝑁 1enc,new , 𝑁 2enc,new , 𝛿)

old
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑎,1..𝑁
old
𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑎,1..𝑁
old
𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦1..𝑁
𝑛 new
1..𝑁
𝑒𝑑𝑒 𝑓 new
new
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑒
𝑓
new
𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑒
𝑓

old conditional coin notes, N=1 or 2
old note spending key, N=1 or 2
Merkle tree (𝑀 tx ) positions of the old note commitments,
N=1 or 2
Merkle tree (𝑀 tx ) paths of the old note commitments, N=1
or 2
random seed
event outcome announcements associated with the old conditional coin notes, N=1 or 2
Merkle tree (𝑀 ea ) positions of the event outcome announcements associated with the old notes, N=1 or 2
Merkle tree (𝑀 ea ) paths of the event outcome announcements
associated with the old notes, N=1 or 2
one of the old notes is a dummy note or not, N=1 or 2
new conditional coin notes, N=1 or 2
event definition associated with the new conditional coin
notes
Merkle tree (𝑀 edef ) position of the event definition associated
with the new note
Merkle tree (𝑀 edef ) path of the event definition associated
with the new note

When generating 𝜋JoinSplit , the proving circuit verifies a set of
constraints for the generated transaction, which is applied to generate a proof to be checked by a verifier.
ReceiveCPC : Given public parameters 𝑝𝑝 CPC , Merkle trees and
their roots, recipient key pair (𝑎 pk , 𝑠𝑘 enc ), and the ledger 𝐿CPC , it
outputs received note 𝑛 new , or output ⊥. The algorithm follows the
Zcash design. It scans the ledger and outputs received note for each
JoinSplit transaction.
VerifyCPC : It takes a set of inputs as described in Algorithm 5. It
appends 𝑡𝑥 JoinSplit , 𝑛 new
and 𝑛 new
to the ledger, or output ⊥.
1
2

4.3

Event transactions

Algorithm 6 creates a new transaction 𝑡𝑥 ea for an event outcome
given public parameters 𝑝𝑝 CPC , ledger 𝐿CPC , and the corresponding
event definition 𝑒𝑑𝑒 𝑓 .
After 𝑡𝑥 ea is received by the blockchain nodes, it will be validated.
If the event outcome can be accepted, it will be appended to the
ledger 𝐿CPC including update of Merkle tree 𝑀 ea and its root 𝑟𝑡 ea .

5

SECURITY ANALYSIS

The conditional privacy coin protocol is based on extending the
data models and transaction design of the original Zcash protocol.
Since the conditional coin algorithms are extensions within the
Zcash framework, most of the security properties that are proven
in the Zcash design and related publications still hold for conditional coins [17][12][7][10]. This means that we can focus on the
properties unique to the conditional coin protocol.
We assume that the underlying blockchain system to support
distributed consensus and network communications is secure and
reliable, which is outside the scope of this work. We further assume
that measures are taken to prevent attacks such as eclipse attack,
51% attack, denial-of-service at network level, side-channel exploits
such as using time delay in transactions as side-channel information,
privacy leakage through network traffic patterns, attack to DNS,
hard forks, quantum attack, and etc. In addition, the system will
ensure that event registration and event outcome declaration are

Algorithm 4: Prove algorithm.

1
2

3
4
5
6
7

8

9

Algorithm 5: Verify algorithm.

Input : 𝑝𝑘 JoinSplit , 𝜒, 𝜔
Output : 𝜋JoinSplit
Verify common constraints below:
old , 𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ old ) valid tree path
Merkle path validity for old notes: (𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑛,𝑖
𝑛,𝑖
from 𝑁 𝑜𝑡𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡 (𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑑
)
to
the
Merkle
tree root 𝑟𝑡 tx
𝑖
𝑛𝑓old

Nullifier integrity: 𝑛𝑓𝑖old = PRF

old
𝑎𝑠𝑘,𝑖
old
Spending key validity: 𝑎𝑝𝑘 = PRF𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟
(0)
old
𝑖
𝑎𝑠𝑘,𝑖
𝜌
new
new
Uniqueness of 𝜌𝑖 : 𝜌𝑖 = PRF𝜑 (𝑖, ℎ sig )
new = NoteCommit (𝑛 new )
Note commit validity: 𝑐𝑚𝑛,𝑖
𝑖
new
Event definition validity in new notes: 𝑛 new
1 .𝑒𝐼 𝐷 = 𝑛 2 .𝑒𝐼 𝐷
new

12

13

tree root 𝑟𝑡 edef
When (𝑛𝑖new .𝑒𝐼 𝐷 ≠ 𝑛𝑖old .𝑒𝐼 𝐷) ∨ (𝑛𝑖new .𝑒𝐼 𝐷 = 𝑛𝑖old .𝑒𝐼 𝐷 ∧ 𝑛𝑖new .𝑒𝐼 𝐷
dft

𝑜𝑙𝑑
Event condition validity: 𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑑
𝑖 .𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 = 𝑒𝑎𝑖 .𝑣
Merkle path validity for the event announcements associated with the
old , 𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ old ) valid tree path from 𝑒𝑎𝑜𝑙𝑑 to the
old notes: (𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑎,𝑖
𝑖
𝑒𝑎,𝑖
Merkle tree root 𝑟𝑡 ea
Sub-circuits to validate constraints for different conditional coin
spending scenarios:
dft
Case: (𝑛𝑖new .𝑒𝐼 𝐷 = 𝑛𝑖old .𝑒𝐼 𝐷) ∧ (𝑛𝑖new .𝑒𝐼 𝐷 ≠ (𝑒𝑑𝑒 𝑓true .𝑒𝐼 𝐷 ∨
dft

15

16

Value validity: 𝑣1𝑜𝑙𝑑 + 𝑣2𝑜𝑙𝑑 = 𝑣1𝑛𝑒𝑤 + 𝑣2𝑛𝑒𝑤
old
new
Event condition validity: 𝑛 new
1 .𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 = 𝑛 2 .𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 = 𝑛𝑖 .𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑
where 𝑖 is either 1 and/or 2 for non dummy input note
𝑛𝑒𝑤 .𝑒𝐼 𝐷 = (𝑒𝑑𝑒 𝑓 𝑑 𝑓 𝑡 .𝑒𝐼 𝐷 ∨
Case: (𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑤
.𝑒𝐼 𝐷 = 𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑑
𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒
𝑖 .𝑒𝐼 𝐷) ∧ (𝑛𝑖
𝑖
dft

𝑒𝑑𝑒 𝑓false .𝑒𝐼 𝐷))
17

Algorithm 6: Algorithm for event announcement transaction.

1
2

𝑒𝑑𝑒 𝑓false .𝑒𝐼 𝐷))
14

4

=
edef
.𝑒𝐼 𝐷
Merkle path validity for the event definition associated with the new
new , 𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ new ) valid tree path from edef new to the Merkle
notes: (𝑝𝑜𝑠 edef
edef

dft

11

2
3

(𝑛𝑖old .𝜌)

= (𝑒𝑑𝑒 𝑓true .𝑒𝐼 𝐷 ∨ 𝑒𝑑𝑒 𝑓false .𝑒𝐼 𝐷)):
10

1

𝑜𝑙𝑑 = 𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑤 + 𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑤 + 𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑤
Value validity: 𝑣1old + 𝑣2𝑜𝑙𝑑 + 𝑣𝑝𝑢𝑏
1
2
𝑝𝑢𝑏

3
4

5
6
7
8

𝑑𝑓 𝑡

18

Input : Public parameters 𝑝𝑝 CPC , ledger 𝐿𝐶𝑃𝐶 , public input 𝜒, a
JoinSplit transaction 𝑡𝑥 join_split , two notes 𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑤
and 𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑤
1
2
Output : accept or reject
Parse 𝑡𝑥 join_split
Set 𝑏1 ←Verify (𝑣𝑘 JoinSplit , 𝜒, 𝜋 JoinSplit )
Set 𝑏2 ←𝜈𝑠𝑖𝑔 (𝑝𝑘𝑠𝑖𝑔 , 𝑚, 𝛿) where m is transaction message and 𝛿 is
message signature defined in Algorithm 3
Output ⊥ if any of the following is true:
• 𝑏1 ∧ 𝑏2 is false
• 𝑛𝑓1𝑜𝑙𝑑 or 𝑛𝑓2𝑜𝑙𝑑 appears on 𝐿𝐶𝑃𝐶 - detect double spending
• 𝑛𝑓1𝑜𝑙𝑑 = 𝑛𝑓2𝑜𝑙𝑑
• Merkle root 𝑟𝑡 tx not on 𝐿𝐶𝑃𝐶
• Merkle root 𝑟𝑡 edef not on 𝐿𝐶𝑃𝐶
• Merkle root 𝑟𝑡 ea not on 𝐿𝐶𝑃𝐶
• ℎ𝑠𝑖𝑔 does not match with CRH(𝑛𝑓1𝑜𝑙𝑑 , 𝑛𝑓2𝑜𝑙𝑑 , 𝑝𝑘𝑠𝑖𝑔 )

𝑛𝑒𝑤 .𝑒𝐼 𝐷 ≠ (𝑒𝑑𝑒 𝑓
Case: (𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑤
.𝑒𝐼 𝐷 ≠ 𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑑
𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 .𝑒𝐼 𝐷 ∨
𝑖 .𝑒𝐼 𝐷) ∧ (𝑛𝑖
𝑖

9

Input : Public parameters 𝑝𝑝 CPC , ledger 𝐿CPC , input event
definition 𝑒𝑑𝑒 𝑓 , event outcome value 𝑣, 𝑠𝑘 sig , block height
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑛
Output : Event outcome announcements associated with the event
definition 𝑒𝑑𝑒 𝑓
Sample a new 𝑒𝑎𝐼 𝐷
Set 𝑒𝑎 = (𝑒𝑑𝑒 𝑓 .𝑒𝐼 𝐷, 𝑒𝑎𝐼 𝐷, 𝑣, 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑛 )
When 𝑒𝑑𝑒 𝑓 .𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑡 is true
𝑛𝑒𝑤 , 𝑠𝑘 𝑛𝑒𝑤 ) = 𝜅 (𝑝𝑝
Create a new signature key pair (𝑝𝑘𝑠𝑖𝑔
sig
𝑠𝑖𝑔 )
𝑠𝑖𝑔
where 𝜅 sig generates a key pair for signature signing
Sample a new 𝑒𝐼 𝐷 𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝑛𝑒𝑤 )
Set 𝑒𝑑𝑒 𝑓 𝑛𝑒𝑤 = (𝑒𝐼 𝐷 𝑛𝑒𝑤 , 𝑒𝑑𝑒 𝑓 .𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑡 , 𝑏𝑡 𝑛𝑒𝑤 , 𝑒𝑑𝑒 𝑓 .𝑏𝑎, 𝑝𝑘𝑠𝑖𝑔
Set transaction message 𝑚 = (𝑒𝑎, 𝑒𝑑𝑒 𝑓 𝑛𝑒𝑤 )
Set message signature 𝛿 = 𝑆 sig (𝑠𝑘 sig , 𝑚)
Set 𝑡𝑥 ea = (𝑚, 𝛿)

𝑑𝑓 𝑡

𝑒𝑑𝑒 𝑓 𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 .𝑒𝐼 𝐷) )
19

Value validity: (𝑣1𝑛𝑒𝑤 = 𝑣2𝑛𝑒𝑤 ) ∧
𝑜𝑙𝑑 = 𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑤 + 𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑤 )
(𝑣1𝑜𝑙𝑑 + 𝑣2𝑜𝑙𝑑 + 𝑣𝑝𝑢𝑏
1
𝑝𝑢𝑏

20

New note event condition validity: (𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑤
.𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 ∧
1
𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑤
.𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 = 𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒) ∨ (𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑤
.𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 ∧
2
2
𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑤
.𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 = 𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒)
1
𝑑𝑓 𝑡

21

𝑛𝑒𝑤 .𝑒𝐼 𝐷 = (𝑒𝑑𝑒 𝑓
Case: (𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑤
.𝑒𝐼 𝐷 ≠ 𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑑
𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 .𝑒𝐼 𝐷 ∨
𝑖 .𝑒𝐼 𝐷) ∧ (𝑛𝑖
𝑖
𝑑𝑓 𝑡
𝑒𝑑𝑒 𝑓 𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 .𝑒𝐼 𝐷)

22

)

𝑜𝑙𝑑 = 𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑤 + 𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑤 + 𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑤
Value validity: 𝑣1𝑜𝑙𝑑 + 𝑣2𝑜𝑙𝑑 + 𝑣𝑝𝑢𝑏
1
2
𝑝𝑢𝑏

properly secured. Event outcome is validated by the participating
nodes of the decentralized ledger using the same consensus mechanism for the conditional coin transactions. Only the entity that
registers an event can declare event outcome in an event outcome
transaction. The transaction is protected by a secure SUF-CMA
signature scheme same in the Zcash design, which prevents forgery
of event outcome transactions. Moreover, it is assumed that there
is no denial-of-service for event outcome (event outcome will be
declared within a bounded time); and for each registered event, the

system accepts only one result 2 . Last but not the least, we consider
that the underlying zero-knowledge proving system is secure.
The original Zcash privacy coin defines security as: (i) Ledger
indistinguishability. ledger reveals no information to the adversary A beyond publicly disclosed information; (ii) Transaction
non-malleability. No bounded adversary A can alter any of the data
stored within a valid transaction. It prevents the adversary from
modifying others’ transactions before they are added to the ledger,
and (iii) Balance. No bounded adversary A can own more notes
than what he minted or received via transactions from others.
In the case of conditional coins, transaction indistinguishability
is extended to cover the requirement that no bounded adversary A
can distinguish transactions with event conditions and transactions
without event conditions. It is apparent that this property is satisfied
because, in the described conditional coin protocol, every coin in the
system has its associated condition, including the default constant
event outcome (always true or always false). All the transactions
apply the same protocol for proof generation and verification.
2 In

our system, a repetitive event will create a new inherited event definition each
time after the outcome is declared.

In addition, users should not be able to learn any information
that can connect conditional coin transactions with event definitions or event outcomes. Both are used as witness information by
the provers (private data only accessible to the provers) to generate
zero-knolwedge proofs. The zero-knowledge protocol verifies existence of the claimed event definition and event outcome against the
two Merkle tree roots. It achieves this goal by verifying a Merkle
tree path from the leaf record to the root for both the event definition and event outcome embedded in a conditional coin note. If
we assume that security properties hold for the underlying zeroknowledge proof system, then confidentiality of the association
between a conditional coin and the corresponding event outcome
is guaranteed.
In case of balance, in conditional coin transactions, a coin can
be split into two coins of equal value (equals with the summed
input coin value), conditional to the opposite outcome of the same
event. According to the protocol design, this transaction is allowed
only when the input coins are shown to satisfy event outcomes
(one of the zero-knowledge proof constraints). Because the event
outcome is binary and the decentralized ledger only accepts one
event outcome per event definition, balance is also guaranteed. In
a conditional coin transaction that the total input coin value is not
divided, using zero-knowledge proof, the prover must show that
the two output coins satisfy the constraint that they embed the
opposite outcomes of the same event as conditions. Using proof by
contradiction, if the balance requirement is violated, this means that
either the underlying zero-knowledge proving system is broken, or
the conditional coin transactions are malleable, or the constraint
that one outcome per event is not satisfied. Any one of these contradicts against the assumptions that the underlying zero-knowledge
proof system (zk-SNARK in this work) is secure; the system abides
by the constraints - one outcome per event; and non-malleability of
coin transactions proven in the case of Zcash transaction protocol
design 3 . Note that due to the asynchronous nature of conditional
coin transactions, the system allows circulation of worthless coins.

6 IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
Zero-knowledge proving system allows anyone to verify a transaction without complete information from a prover. It means that the
system does not need to disclose private transaction information
(e.g., event condition, event definition, event outcome, amounts,
and etc.). The verifier can still validate if the transaction instance
satisfies the preset conditions. In common, zero-knowledge proving
system requires a circuit to generate proofs and verifying keys for
the verifiers. There are tools and libraries available to achieve this
goal.
Implementation: In the experiment implementation, we used xJsnark [13]. xJsnark is a tool that achieves “program-to circuit” conversion, i.e., to compile a user-supplied program described in a
Java-like source language into a compact circuit representation that
is recognized by the existing SNARK libraries. It creates circuits [20]
in a libsnark compatible format so that the resulting SNARK can
be executed using the libsnark back end [14]. xJsnark implements
several optimization to improve efficiency of frequent operations
3 Our

design extends privacy coin note format and applies the same signature scheme
in Zcash to prevent transaction malleability.

Table 3: Key implementation parameters
Attribute
All Merkle tree height
Time stamp
Event ID
Event outcome ID
Coin value

Size
64
64 bits
64 bit
64 bit
64 bits

and reduce circuit size. It supports efficient short and long integer
arithmetic and implements global optimizations for integer arithmetic. The compiler has a built-in optimizer of circuit minimization.
xJsnark has developed a Zcash transaction implementation, which
is used in this study as a baseline. As reported in the xJsnark paper, the Zcash circuit implemented in xJsnark is very efficient. The
compiled circuit under xJsnark is slightly better than the manually optimized implementation. The reason is due to the low-level
arithmetic optimizations and the circuit minimizer.
We extended the Zcash implementation in xJsnark according to
the described design to support events and conditions. A proving
system is used to generate a proof for each JoinSplit transaction
based on the extended data models with event conditions and algorithms. xJsnark builds on top of libsnark. Note that in libsnark, we
need to generate a key pair of < pk, vk > in a ZK proving system.
Eventually, a verifier just needs the vk, public inputs 𝜒, and the
proof 𝜋 to verify a conditional coin transaction.
The system implements three Merkle trees, for conditional coins,
event definitions, and event outcomes. In addition to public input, output, and witness defined in Zcash, we extended with the
following input and witness:
• Additional Input: root of event definition Merkle tree, root
of event outcome Merkle tree, and block height;
• Additional Witness: event definitions (input coins, output
coins), event outcomes (input coins).
Some key parameters are listed in Table 3. In the beginning, the
circuit verifies the validity of different transaction scenarios by
checking both input event conditions and output event definitions.
For instance, a conditional coin can be transferred with the event
condition kept intact. In case a new event condition is attached, the
circuit verifies event outcome announcements associated with the
input coins and the event definition for the output coins. In addition,
the proving circuit verifies the conditions that are common for all
the transaction scenarios.
Circuit evaluation: The experiments were conducted using an
Intel Xeon computer that has 8 Xeon cores and 64GB ram and
running on Ubuntu 18.04. Size of the produced circuit was measured,
as well as proving key and verifying key. The total number of
constraints is 11781616 (without optimization) and 8792171 (with
xJsnark optimization), respectively. The degree of corresponding
QAP is 8912896. The size of the proof key is 16767402202 bits, and
the size of the verification key is 29468 bits. The expansion of the
circuit size is primarily due to verification of additional Merkle tree
hash paths (event definitions and event announcements). The circuit
size is dominated by Merkle hash tree path verification. Future
implementation and evaluation could employ k-anonymity and
other zero-knowledge proof system to improve speed and efficiency.

The proof size in bits is 2294. It takes on average 261 seconds to
compute proof, and verification takes on average 0.042 second.

7 RELATED WORK
Main related work can be categorized into: (i) Conditional coin
research before blockchains: The concept of electronic cash with
its value conditional to event outcome can be found in the literature (e.g., [23]) before Bitcoin [18]. These schemes do not rely on
distributed ledgers in their designs. (ii) Smart contract with event
triggers: Cryptocurrencies can be deposited to a smart contract.
Later, depending on the result of an event based trigger, the locked
crypto-assets can be re-distributed. The work with “mixicles” [9]
shows us that smart contracts whose results are dependent on
the occurrence of the real-world event must employ Oracles as
“triggers” for distribution of the funds. The main distinguishing
property of conditional privacy coins is that coins with event conditions attached can be treated as regular privacy coins, thus can
be transferred, split, and traded (support for transferability and
non-trigger based transaction processing asynchronous to event
handling). There is no trigger in the system and no lockup of assets
unlike the previous work [9] where tumblers are triggered by the
Oracle inputs. (iii) Oracles: Oracles [11] relay authenticated data
from external sources to blockchain-based systems so that the data
can be used by smart contracts, for instance as event triggers. Oracle
can leverage trusted third parties, MPC (e.g. [26], [15]), TEEs (e.g.,
[25], [21]), etc. In the context of conditional coins, Oracle services
mostly relate to event processing and validation of external data.
These research efforts are complementary to the main conditional
coin protocol design in this work. (iv) Contingent payments: In [6],
the authors showed how to perform zero-knowledge contingent
payments (ZKCP) in Bitcoin securely. The focus of conditional coins
and ZKCP is different as the main objective of conditional privacy
coins is to enable privacy preserving and transferable crypto-assets
with their values conditional with respect to event outcomes. It
applies the approach that decouples event processing from cryptcurrency transaction processing, which distinguishes from ZKCP.
It is worth mentioning that conditional coins can support the use
cases of contingent payments. (v) Privacy coins: Last but not the
least, the related work includes implementations of confidential
cryptocurrencies and assets (e.g., [5, 16, 19]). As we have demonstrated, conditional coins are intended as an extension or to be
integrated with confidential or privacy crypto-currencies to enable
use cases where values of confidential coins are conditional to event
outcomes, and meanwhile the associations between conditional
coins and event registration/event outcomes are kept confidential.

8 CONCLUSION
This paper develops a blockchain based confidential conditional
coin system with privacy protection, which utilizes zero-knowledge
proof technology. Extending the Zcash data model, the conditional
privacy coin encodes event outcome as part of the privacy coin
UTXO notes. A main advantage of such design is that, without
relying on any trigger mechanism, the system separates event processing from privacy coin transaction processing. Conditional coins
can be transferred freely with their values conditional to the linked
event outcomes. The designed system is implemented and evaluated
using xJsnark.
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